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ORIGINAL RESEARCH REPORT
When and Why to Replicate: As Easy as 1, 2, 3?
Sarahanne M. Field, Rink Hoekstra, Laura Bringmann and Don van Ravenzwaaij
The crisis of confidence in psychology has prompted vigorous and persistent debate in the scientific 
community concerning the veracity of the findings of psychological experiments. This discussion has led 
to changes in psychology’s approach to research, and several new initiatives have been developed, many 
with the aim of improving our findings. One key advancement is the marked increase in the number of 
replication studies conducted. We argue that while it is important to conduct replications as part of 
regular research protocol, it is neither efficient nor useful to replicate results at random. We recommend 
adopting a methodical approach toward the selection of replication targets to maximize the impact of 
the outcomes of those replications, and minimize waste of scarce resources. In the current study, we 
demonstrate how a Bayesian re–analysis of existing research findings followed by a simple qualitative 
assessment process can drive the selection of the best candidate article for replication.
Keywords: replication; transparency; psychological science; Bayesian reanalysis
In 2005, Ioannidis published a theoretical article (2005), in 
which he argued that more than half of published findings 
may be false. The landmark mass replication effort of the 
Open Science Collaboration (henceforth OSC; 2015) gave 
empirical support for Ioannidis’s claims a decade after 
they were made, but reported an even bleaker narrative. 
Only 36% of replication studies were successful in yielding 
a result comparable to that reported in the original article 
(more recent mass replication attempts have revealed 
similarly low reproducibility levels: Klein et al., 2018; 
Camerer et al., 2018). To put this finding in context: had all 
of the original results been true, a minimum reproducibility 
rate of 89% would be expected, according to the OSC 
(2015). These figures reflect the gravity of what is now 
known as the crisis of confidence, or replicability crisis, 
in science. Though the discussion began in psychology, 
reports of unsatisfactory reproducibility rates have come 
from many different fields in the scientific community 
(Baker 2016; Begley & Ioannidis, 2015; Chang & Li, 2018).
The literature has suggested a number of potential causes 
for poor reproducibility of research findings. One of the most 
obvious candidate causes is the publish or perish culture in 
academia (Grimes, Bauch, & Ioannidis, 2018), which describes 
the pressure on researchers to publish much and often in 
order to maintain their university faculty positions, or to 
move up the hierarchical ‘ladder’. Another possible cause 
is the alarmingly high prevalence of QRPs (questionable 
research practises) in which researchers engage. HARKing 
(hypothesizing after the results are known), p-hacking (where 
one massages the data to procure a significant p-value) and 
the ‘file drawer’ problem (where researchers do not attempt 
to publish their null results) are all examples of QRPs (Kerr, 
1998; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Rosenthal, 1979). 
They lead to a literature that is unreliable, and apparently in 
many cases (and often as a result), impossible to replicate.
Irrespective of the causes of the crisis of confidence, 
its consequence is irrefutable: scientific communities 
are questioning the veracity of many of the key findings 
of psychology, and are hesitant to trust the conclusions 
upon which they are based. A recent online Nature news 
story suggested that most scientific results should not be 
trusted (Baker, 2015). Research psychologists are asking 
whether science is “broken” (Woolston 2015); others 
have referred to the “terrifying unraveling” of the field 
(Aschwanden, 2016). Proposed solutions to this crisis of 
confidence have revolved around reviewers demanding 
openness as a condition to provide reviews (Morey et al., 
2016), guidelines for more openness and transparency 
(Nosek et al., 2015), preregistration and registered reports 
(Dablander, 2017), and funding schemes directly aimed at 
replication (such as those of the Netherlands Organisation 
for Scientific Research: https://www.nwo.nl/en/news-
and-events/news/2017/social-sciences/repeating-
important-research-thanks-to-replication-studies.html).
These initiatives, while a first step in the right direction, 
only go so far to remedy the problem because they are 
preemptive in nature; only prescribing best practice for 
the future. They cannot help untangle the messy current 
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literature body we continue to build upon. The most 
direct way to get more clarity about previously reported 
findings may well be through replication (but see Zwaan, 
Etz, Lucas, & Donnellan, 2018, who discuss some caveats). 
Therefore, psychological science needs a way to separate 
the wheat from the chaff; a way to determine which 
findings to trust and which to disregard. Replication of 
existing empirical research articles is a practical way to 
meet this dire need. The need for replications introduces a 
second generation of complications related to interest in 
conducting replication studies: a flood of new replications 
of existing research can be found in the literature, and 
more are being conducted.
In theory, this up-tick in the number of replications 
being conducted is a good development for the field 
(especially given that up until recently, replication studies 
only occupied about 1 percent of the literature body: see 
Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012), however in practice, 
so much interest in conducting replications leads to a 
logistical problem: there exists a vast body of literature 
that could be subject to replication. The question is: how 
does one select which studies to replicate from the ever-
increasing pool of candidates? Which replications retread 
already ‘well-trodden ground’, and which move research 
forward (Chawla, 2016)? These questions have serious 
practical implications, given the scarcity of resources (such 
as participants and time) in many scientific research fields.
Several recommendations to point us in the right 
direction exist in the literature already. A great number of 
these happen to be conveniently grouped as commentaries 
to Zwaan and colleagues’ recent impactful article: ‘Making 
Replication Mainstream’ (2018). For instance, Coles, 
Tiokhin, Scheel, Isager and Lakens (2018), and Hardwicke 
and colleagues (2018) urge potential replicators to use a 
formalized decision making process, and only conduct 
a replication when the results of a cost-benefit analysis 
suggest that the benefits of such a replication outweigh 
the associated costs. Additionally, they emphasize con-
sidering other factors such as the prior plausibility of the 
original article’s reported effects. Kuehberger and Schulte-
Mecklenbeck (2018) argue against selecting replications 
studies at random and discuss potential biases that can 
emerge in the process of selecting studies to replicate. 
Little and Smith single out problems with existing 
literature as reasons for replication failure (such as weak 
theory measurement), which can be reasons for targeting 
some original studies for replication, over others. Finally, 
Witte and Zenker (2018) recommend replication only 
those studies which provide theoretically important 
findings to the literature. Coming from the opposite angle, 
Schimmack (2018) provides reasoning as to why to not 
replicate certain studies, which, naturally, is also useful in 
refining ones selection criteria for replication targets.
One could say that, broadly, there are three different 
facets to selecting replication targets, associated with the 
different information contained in a published article: 
statistical, theoretical and methodological. In the next 
two subsections, we first discuss statistical considerations 
and then theoretical and methodological considerations 
in turn.
Statistical Considerations
First, studies can be selected for replication when their 
claims require additional corroboration, based on the 
statistical evidence reported in the publication. This is 
a statistical approach to determining what should be 
replicated first. Null-hypothesis significance testing (or 
NHST) dominates the literature, meaning that the bulk of 
statistical testing involves reporting p-values.
Although there are numerous downsides to using 
NHST to quantify scientific evidence (for a discussion, see 
Wagenmakers, 2007), we focus on one key drawback here 
which relates directly to our discussion. The p-value only 
allows us to reject the null hypothesis: there is a single 
evidence threshold, meaning that we cannot use the 
p-value to gather evidence in favor of the null hypothesis, 
no matter how much evidence may exist for it. Given that 
it is unlikely that each study reporting an effect is based 
on a true main effect (Ioannidis, 2005), but that studies 
rarely use statistical techniques to quantify evidence for 
the absence of an effect, there is a mismatch in what we 
can conclude and what we want to conclude from our 
statistical inference (Haucke, Miosga, Hoekstra, & van 
Ravenzwaaij, 2019).
One alternative to quantifying statistical evidence with 
the conventional NHST framework is by means of Bayes 
factors. Throughout this paper, we will use a relatively 
diffuse default prior distribution for effect size to reflect 
the fact that we do not possess strong prior information 
(see also Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016). In this paper we 
examine scenarios calling for a t-test. For such designs, one 
of the most prominent default specifications uses what 
is known as the Jeffreys-Zellner-Siow (JZS) class of priors. 
Development of these so-called JZS Bayes factors have 
been built on the pioneering work of Jeffreys (1961) and 
Zellner and Siow (1980). The JZS Bayes factor quantifies 
the likelihood of the data under the null hypothesis (with 
effect size δ = 0) relative to the likelihood of the data under 
the alternative hypothesis. For a two-sided test, the range 
of alternative hypotheses is given by a prior on the effect 
size parameter δ, which follows a Cauchy distribution with 
a scale parameter 1/ 2r =  (see, Rouder, Speckman, Sun, 
Morey, & Iverson, 2009, equation in note 4 on page 237). 
In terms of interpretation, a Bayes factor of BF10 = 5 means 
the data are 5 times more likely to have occurred under 
the alternative hypothesis than under the null hypothesis. 
In comparison, a Bayes factor of BF10 = 1/5 (or the inverse 
of 5), means the observed data are five times more likely 
to have occurred under the null hypothesis than under 
the alternative hypothesis.1
The application of the JZS Bayes factor for a large-scale 
reanalysis of published results is not without precedent 
(Hoekstra, Monden, van Ravenzwaaij, & Wagenmakers, 
2018). We build upon the work of Hoekstra and colleagues 
in taking the results of such a Bayesian reanalysis as a 
starting point for selecting replication targets (for a similar 
approach, see Pittelkow, Hoekstra, & van Ravenzwaaij, 
2019).
So why not simply use p-values as our selection 
mechanism for existing statistical evidence? When NHST 
results are reanalyzed and transformed into Bayes factors, 
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the relationship between Bayes factors and p-values can 
be strong if the analyzed studies have mostly comparable 
sample sizes (Wetzels et al., 2011; Aczel, Palfi, & Szaszi, 
2017). However, when studies have differing sample sizes, 
this relationship is no longer straightforward (for instance, 
see Hoekstra and colleagues (2018), who show that for 
non-significant findings the strength of pro-null evidence 
is better predicted by N than by the p-value, and that larger 
N studies are “more likely to provide compelling evidence”, 
p. 6). Consider the following example for illustration.
We have two results of classical statistical inference:
Scenario 1: t(198) = 1.97, p = .05
Scenario 2: t(199998) = 1.96, p = .05
In both cases, the p-value is significant at the conventional 
alpha-level of .05, however due to the very different sample 
size in both scenarios, these two sets of results reflect 
very different levels of evidential strength. The Bayes 
factor, unlike the p-value, can differentiate between these 
two sets of results. Through the lens of the Bayes factor, 
scenario 1 presents ambiguous evidence: BF10 = 0.94 (i.e., 
the data is about equally likely to occur under the null 
hypothesis as under the alternative hypotheses). A Bayes 
factor for scenario 2 presents strong evidence in favor of 
the null: BF10 = 0.03 (i.e., the data is about 29 times more 
likely to occur under the null hypothesis than under the 
alternative hypothesis). Using the p-value as a criterion for 
which study to replicate would not differentiate between 
these two scenarios, whereas the Bayes factor allows us to 
decide that in case of Scenario 2, we have strong evidence 
that the null hypothesis is true (and so, arguably, no further 
replication is needed), whereas in case of Scenario 1, the 
evidence is ambiguous and replication is warranted.
In this paper, we apply a Bayesian reanalysis to 
several recent research findings, the end-goal being to 
demonstrate a technique one can use to reduce a large 
pool of potential replication targets to a manageable list. 
The Bayesian reanalysis is diagnostic in the sense that 
it can assist us in separating findings into three classes, 
or tiers of results: (1) results for which the statistical 
evidence pro-alternative is compelling (no replication 
is needed); (2) results for which the statistical evidence 
pro-null is compelling (no replication is needed); (3) 
results for which the statistical evidence is ambiguous 
(replication may be needed depending on theoretical and 
methodological considerations). We reiterate here that, 
crucially, p-values are unable to differentiate between 
results which belong in the second of these categorical 
classes, and those that belong in the third. The third 
class of studies will be carried into the next ‘phase’ of 
our demonstration, wherein we further scrutinize study 
results with ambiguous statistical evidence on theoretical 
and methodological considerations that might factor into 
the decision to replicate.
Theoretical and Methodological Considerations
Mackey (2012) provides some pointers on how one may 
select a replication target based on the theoretical content 
of a reported research finding. She suggests that in order 
to qualify as a ‘candidate’ for replication, a study should 
address theoretically important (for short, ‘theoretical 
importance’) and currently relevant research questions 
(‘relevance’). A study also qualifies if it concerns studies in 
the field that are accepted as true in the field, but have yet 
to be sufficiently investigated (‘insufficient investigation’).2 
The theoretical approach will be explained as we describe 
it in a practical application later in the paper.
The last facet to selecting replication studies concerns 
methodological information. While many aspects of a 
study’s methodology are highly specific to the paradigm 
of the article in question (e.g., the use of certain materials 
like visual stimuli), some elements of methodology can 
be discussed in general (e.g., sample size). As with the 
theoretical facet, methodology will be discussed in more 
detail during the later demonstration.
Outline
A replication study itself is beyond the scope of this paper, 
however we offer a demonstration of how the combined 
use of theory and Bayesian statistics can drive a methodical 
and qualitative approach to selecting replication targets 
in the psychological sciences. Additionally, we offer 
theoretical and methodological recommendations, in case 
such a replication were to be conducted. Please note that 
although the theoretical context and methodology of a 
study is important for selecting studies for replication, our 
demonstration focuses primarily on applying the Bayesian 
reanalysis to this challenge.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
the method section, we share details of our treatment of 
the replication candidate pool in the reanalysis phase. We 
then describe the results of the initial selection process, 
before moving on to describing the qualitative phase of 
the filtering process. We make recommendations based 
on our selection process, for a fictional replication study. 
The article ends with our discussion, wherein we justify 
certain subjective choices we have made and consider 
philosophical issues, and share the limitations of our 
method.
Method
We extracted statistical details from articles in the 2015 
and 2016 Psychological Science and performed a Bayesian 
reanalysis to make a first selection of which studies could 
be targets for replication, based on the evidential strength 
of the results reported. Once this initial selection was made, 
we further refined the selection based on the theoretical 
soundness of the conclusions drawn from the selected 
studies, and considered the support for the finding which 
exists in the literature already. The approach combined 
quantitative and qualitative methods: on the one hand, 
the initial selection was based on an empirical process, and 
on the other, the refinement of the selection was based 
on a process involving judgments of the findings in the 
context of the literature and theory. The process took the 
first author less than a working week to complete. Given 
that we provide the reader with the reanalysis code, and 
the spreadsheet with the necessary values to complete 
the reanalysis, we believe that attempts by others to use 
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our method for a similarly sized sample would not be any 
more time-intensive than our original execution.
Sample
All Psychological Science articles from 2015 and 2016 issues 
were searched for reported significant statistical tests 
(one–sample, paired, and independent t-tests), associated 
with primary research questions. As mentioned, we 
used statistical significance as our criterion for selecting 
results to reanalyze. All of the articles reporting t-tests 
to test their main hypotheses used p-values to quantify 
their findings. We extracted the t-values and other details 
required for the reanalysis (including N and p-value) for 
30 articles which contained t-tests (the data spreadsheet 
which logs these details for each statistic extracted is 
on the project’s Open Science Framework (OSF) page at 
https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/3RF8B).
Incomplete or unclear reporting practices posed a 
challenge in the first step of selecting which articles to 
reanalyze. Determining whether the executed tests were 
one- or two-sided was often difficult, as articles frequently 
failed to report the type of test conducted. Several articles 
which used t-tests as part of their main analysis strategy 
were ultimately not included in the reanalysis, as not all 
information was available (not even to the extent that 
we could reverse engineer other necessary details). One 
article, which reported two t-tests in support of their main 
finding, was excluded from the final reanalysis. Due to 
unclear reporting, we were unable to identify what the 
study’s method entailed, and, therefore, how the reported 
results were reached. We explore the reporting problem in 
detail in the discussion section.
In total, from the 24 issues of 2015/2016 Psychological 
Science, 326 ‘research articles’ and ‘research reports’ 
were manually scanned for studies in which a major 
hypothesis was tested using a t-test. Of these, 57 results 
were derived from 30 individual articles. Several articles 
reported more than one primary experimental finding 
which was analyzed using a t-test. Different approaches 
yielded judgments of whether or not a finding was of 
focal importance. First, if a specific finding was reported 
in the abstract, it would be selected (where possible). The 
rationale for this approach was that the abstract has only 
got space for documenting the most important results 
of the study, thus only key findings will be reported in it. 
A finding was also selected if somewhere in the article it 
was tested in a primary hypothesis, or was explicitly noted 
by the authors of the article as being important for the 
study’s conclusions. Many articles reported several t-tests 
in support of a single broader hypothesis. In such cases 
we attempted to select the results which most directly 
supported the author’s conclusions.
Descriptive Results
P-values, test statistics, sample sizes and test sidedness 
were collected for the purpose of the reanalysis. The 
p-values ranged in value; the largest was .047. The test 
statistics and sample sizes obtained also ranged greatly. 
The absolute test statistics ranged from 2.00 to 7.49. The 
range of the sample sizes is from N = 16 to N = 484. The 
distribution of study sample sizes is heavily right-skewed. 
The median for this sample is 54 – smaller than recent 
estimates of typical sample sizes in psychological research 
(Marszalek, Barber, Kohlhart, & Cooper, 2011).
In the Bayesian reanalysis, we converted reported 
information extracted from articles into Bayes factors, 
to assess the strength of evidence given by each result.3 
The Bayes factors range widely: 0.97 to 1.9 × 1010, or 
approximately 19 billion. Almost half of them are between 
1 and 5.
A clear negative relationship between the Bayes factors 
and the reported p-values is shown in Figure 1. Despite 
the nature of this relationship, some small p-values are 
associated with a range of Bayes factors (around the 
p = .04 mark, for instance). A positive relationship between 
Bayes factors and sample sizes can be seen in Figure 2. 
Unsurprisingly, larger sample sizes are generally associated 
with larger Bayes factors (r = .71), though it is not the case 
that large sample sizes are always associated with more 
compelling Bayes factors. For instance, many cases in the 
N = 200 region are associated with somewhat weak Bayes 
factors. In one case, the overall N of 30 converts to a Bayes 
factor of over 151,000, in another case, the overall N of 35 
is associated with a Bayes factor of over 21,000.
Quantitative Target Selection
In this paper, we will make an initial selection based on 
those studies in tier 3: whose results yield only ambiguous 
evidence in relation to support for their reported 
hypotheses. For this purpose, we will judge such ambiguity, 
or low evidential strength, as when a study’s BF10 lies 
between 1/3 and 3, which, by Jeffrey’s (1961) classification 
system provides no more than ‘anecdotal’ evidence for one 
hypothesis over the other.
Using the BayesFactor package in R (Morey, Rouder, 
& Jamil, 2015), we calculated Bayes factors (BF) for each 
test statistic using the extracted test statistics, and other 
information gathered: p-values, test statistics, sample sizes 
and sidedness of the test. While the vast majority did not 
explicitly state that they were confirmatory, most results 
were presented as though they were. The code written for 
the analysis which is associated with the data spreadsheet 
can be found at the project’s OSF page: https://doi.
org/10.17605/OSF.IO/3RF8B.
The reanalysis revealed that the Bayesian reanalysis 
placed 20 results in evidence tier 3. One of these 
yielded a Bayes factor below 1 (0.97), which, by Jeffrey’s 
classification system, demonstrates anecdotal pro-null 
evidence. The remainder of the results lie in tier 1. As 
we were only interested in those articles for which an 
effect was reported, no results falling in tier 2 (those with 
compelling pro-null evidence) exist in this dataset. The 
reanalysis has reduced the pool of results from 57 to 20 
candidates for replication. We now move onto the next 
stage of target selection.
Qualitative Target Selection
Of the 20 results in tier 3, we select those demonstrating 
the weakest evidence for their effects. If there is an article 
for which many results fall in tier 3, these will also be 
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Figure 1: Scatterplot of Bayes factors and p-values plotted on a log-log scale. The horizontal dashed lines indicate 
 Jeffreys’ thresholds for anecdotal evidence (3, for pro-alternative cases, and the inverse for pro-null cases). The vertical 






















































Figure 2: Scatterplot of Bayes factors and sample size plotted on a log-log scale. The horizontal dashed lines indicate 
Jeffreys’ thresholds for anecdotal evidence (3, for pro-alternative cases; the inverse for pro-null cases). The cases in 
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considered.4 We will then conduct an assessment based 
on the qualitative criteria of Mackey (2012): theoretical 
importance, relevance, and insufficient investigation. 
Alongside Mackey’s criteria, we consider the need for the 
finding in question to be replicated under different study 
conditions or with a different sample than the original (to 
establish the external validity of the effect in question), as 
well as replication feasibility (for instance, can this study 
be replicated by generally-equipped labs, or are more 
specific experimental set-ups necessary?). We will refer to 
the articles by the article number we have given them (the 
article and reanalysis details corresponding to these can 
be found in Appendix A; a full table of all the details can 
be found on the OSF page for this project, at https://doi.
org/10.17605/OSF.IO/3RF8B).
The first to consider is the article revealed by the 
reanalysis to contain anecdotal pro-null evidence in one 
of its studies: article 8, from Dai, Milkman and Riis (2015). 
The authors of article 8 report on the so-called ‘fresh start 
effect’. This effect refers to the use of temporal landmarks 
to initiate goal pursuit. More specifically, the authors’ 
report supports claims that certain times of year (for 
instance, New Year’s Eve) are especially potent motivators 
for starting new habits (such as working out, or eating 
more wisely). Although some evidence in this article is 
weakly pro-null (result 8a), one strike against naming 
article 8a as a suitable target for replication, is that the 
article contains a second result we reanalyzed (result 8b) 
which yielded a Bayes factor of 5.05 (constituting pro-
alternative evidence: Gronau et al., 2017).5
In terms of Mackey’s (2012) criteria, the study is 
difficult to judge as a replication target. Article 8’s topic 
is theoretically important and certainly currently relevant: 
understanding the relationship between motivation 
and initiating healthy eating behavior is important for 
many reasons (for developing strategies to lowering the 
global burden of health due to preventable disease, for 
instance). However, the link between temporal landmarks 
and motivation has been demonstrated often and by 
different research groups (Peetz & Wilson, 2013; Mogilner, 
Hershfield, & Aaker, 2018; Urminsky, 2017), as well as in 
other studies by related groups (Dai, Milkman, & Riis, 
2014; Lee & Dai, 2017), including a randomized clinical 
trial measuring adherence to medical treatment (Dai et al., 
2017).
Although this phenomenon has been the subject of 
many different studies, and the content of article 8 lends 
itself to interesting replications in which one varies, for 
instance, the culture of the sample, existing literature in 
the area already demonstrates the effect in other cultures 
than the USA (e.g., Germany: Peetz & Wilson, 2013), it is 
not a clear replication target, in our assessment.
The majority of the remaining results in tier 3 show 
Bayes factors that are homogeneous in terms of their 
magnitude– for instance, half of the results have a Bayes 
factor between 1 and 2. Additionally, for articles with 
multiple reanalyzed studies, we see only one case in which 
each of these studies fell into tier 3. They may reflect one 
study of many in an article which overall, through other 
tests, provides strong evidence of a main effect. Both 
of these reasons render the majority of the sample less 
attractive as replication candidates.
Despite this, two articles (both featuring multiple low 
Bayes factors each) are potential targets.6 We now commit 
these to the qualitative assessment to determine their 
suitability for replication, in no particular order.
One potential replication target is article 4 (Reinhart, 
McClenahan, and Woodman, 2015), in which the hypoth-
esis that using mental imagery, or ‘visualizing’ can improve 
attention to targets in a visual search scene was tested. 
The authors recorded reaction times (RT) and event-
related potentials (quantified as N2pc amplitudes, which 
reflect ongoing neural processes – in this case, attention) 
in response to the provided stimuli. They reported 
support for their hypothesis: imagining the visual search 
for certain targets did increase the speed at which 
participants focused on the specified targets (indexed by 
the ERP), before the motor response of pressing a button 
to confirm they had located the target. This article yielded 
three t-tests (each testing the experimental conditions on 
RT), which are of interest to us. We refer to them as results 
4a through 4c, respectively. They appear in the results for 
the first experiment, which we judged to be a clear test of 
their primary hypothesis. Each of these t-tests correspond 
to a small Bayes factor. The RT tests correspond to Bayes 
factors of 3.19, 1.99 and 2.02, while the EEG tests yielded 
Bayes factors of 1.83 and 2.53. (the two other t-tests in the 
sets were not significant, thus are not of interest to us for 
the purposes of this reanalysis).
This article meets several of the qualitative criteria too. 
First, the topic is theoretically important and currently 
relevant. Training the brain for better performance has 
been gaining momentum in the past decade, partly 
prompted by several articles that support the positive 
link between video-gaming and improved mental perfor-
mance in different cognitive domains (such as attention: 
Green & Bavelier, 2012, 2012). Exploring the link further 
with studies such as this can be beneficial to many 
areas of psychology and medicine (e.g., for working 
with patients of brain damage that are undergoing 
rehabilitation). Second, there is little supporting evidence 
for the link between visualization and improved attention; 
importantly, some of the literature aiming to reinforce 
the findings of article 4 contradicts it. For instance, the 
preregistered failed replication and extension of article 4’s 
experiments conducted by Clarke, Barr and Hunt (2016) 
showed repeated searching – not visualization – improved 
attention. Other factors to consider are generalization 
and feasibility. The suitability of article 4 as a replication 
target is supported by fact that this article has already 
been a target for replication, and that that replication did 
not conclusively reinforce its conclusions. It is possible 
that this study should be weighted differently in the 
sample due to the previous replication. Indeed, one could 
numerically account for the evidence contributed by the 
existing replication (e.g., Gronau et al., 2017). We consider 
that to be outside of the scope of this paper.
Their sample for experiment one was comprised of 
adults between the ages of 18 and 35, with a gender split 
of 62% to 38% in favor of women. The findings of article 4 
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could benefit from a replication using a different sample: 
for instance, one with individuals from an older age range. 
Although age is not thought to impair neuroplasticity, 
older persons exhibit plasticity occurring in different 
regions of the brain than younger persons influencing 
the mechanisms underlying visual perceptual learning 
(Yotsumoto et al., 2014), which may influence their 
response to the stimuli presented in the experiments in 
the article. This has implications for the generalizability 
of the results. Another potentially important factor for 
consideration is gender. A recent review article by Dachtler 
and Fox (2017) reports clear gender differences in plasticity 
that are likely to influence several cognitive domains 
(including learning and memory), due to circulating 
hormones such as estrogen, which are known to influence 
synaptogenesis. To summarize, we find article 4 to be 
suitable as a replication candidate. Specifically, some of its 
findings could benefit from external reinforcement in the 
form of a conceptual replication in which factors such as 
age and gender are taken into consideration. Further, the 
results may benefit from a more in-depth exploration into 
the effect of searching versus visualization on attention.
Another replication target that our sample yielded is 
article 12: Kupor, Laurin and Levav (2015). Mentioned 
above, all reanalyzed results of this article (i.e., a through 
c) fall into tier 3. Article 12 (which includes 5 studies, each 
with sub-studies), explores the general hypothesis that 
reminders of God increase risk-taking behavior. In study 1, 
which this reanalysis focused solely on (as it most directly 
tested the key hypothesis), four sub-studies are identified: 
1a, 1b, 1c and 1d. The first three contain t-tests, while the 
fourth contains a chi-square test. We consider only the 
results of 1a through c (12a through c) for the current 
reanalysis.
In the study corresponding to result 12a, participants 
performed a priming task involving scrambled sentences. 
Half the participants were primed with concepts of God, 
by way of exposure to words such as “divine” (p. 375). The 
other half, which forms the control group, were exposed 
only to neutral words. Once participants were primed, 
they completed a self-report risk-taking scale which was 
explained to participants as being an unrelated study. This 
scale revealed their likely risk-taking behavior in a one to 
five Likert scale. In the study yielding result 12b, following 
the manipulation, participants described the likelihood 
that they would attempt a risky recreational task that they 
had described themselves at an earlier point. In the study 
corresponding to result 12c, participants were tested on 
their interest in risk-taking via a behavioral measure, once 
they were primed in the first phase of the experiment. In 
each of these three experiments, participants primed with 
concepts of God reported or behaved as predicted: more 
predisposed to risk-taking than their neutrally-primed 
counterparts. Despite these three experiments yielding 
significant p-values, the reanalysis revealed three Bayes 
factors all suggesting the evidence is ambiguous: 1.96, 
1.68 and 1.83, respectively for results 12a–c.
We now assess article 12 on the qualitative factors 
we described earlier. First, we consider the theoretical 
importance and current relevance of this article. Given 
that the majority of the world identifies as being religious 
(84%, according to recent statistics: Hackett, Stonawski, 
Potančoková, Grim, & Skirbekk, 2015), understanding 
the role of religion in moderating behavior is important, 
to say the least. According to the authors of article 12, 
behavior modification programs such as those employed 
for drug and alcohol rehabilitation use concepts of God 
and religion as a tool to reduce delinquent behavior. While 
this topic has attracted the attention of several research 
groups globally (meaning the article does not naturally 
meet the ‘insufficient evidence’ criterion), the reanalyzed 
results in article 12 go against the majority of this body of 
work: “… we propose that references to God can have the 
opposite effect, and increase the tendency to take certain 
types of risks” (p. 374), and do not seem to have direct 
strong support in the literature as yet (a paucity of indirect 
support can be found, e.g., Wu & Cutright, 2018).
In assessing the characteristics of article 12’s sample, 
some details indicating the suitability of article 12 for 
replication come to light. First, article 12 reports using 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online workforce, which is 
comprised of approximately 80% U.S.-based workers, 
and 20% Indian workers. Given that the majority of 
the Mechanical Turk workers are from the U.S., and the 
overwhelming majority of the U.S. reports being affiliated 
with Christianity, we expect that the majority of this 
sample respond with a mindset of trusting in a God which 
is thought to intervene on the behalf of the faithful, 
responding to prayers for things like healing, guidance 
and help with personal troubles. The results of article 12 
might be very different if the participant pool contained 
mostly practitioners of Buddhism (for example), as 
Buddhism emphasizes the importance of enlightenment 
(when an individual achieves an understanding of life’s 
truth), and personal effort, rather than the intervention 
of a divine being (which is relevant given that feelings of 
security are thought to increase willingness to engage in 
certain behaviors: p. 374).
The age of article 12’s sample is also relevant to their 
results, considering that the majority of workers (>50%) 
were born in the 1980s. Recent polls indicate that younger 
individuals across Europe, the USA and Australia are less 
religious than their older counterparts (Harris, 2018; 
Wang, 2015; Schneiders, 2013), meaning that a successful 
replication of article 12’s results with a predominantly 
aged population (as opposed to the mean ages of 23, 31 
and 34 years, reported in the article) would demonstrate 
the generalizability of the finding that God-priming 
increases risk taking.7 Another possibility also relates 
to age – perhaps the effect is greatly decreased in aged 
persons, simply by virtue of maturity: Risk-taking, even for 
rewards, decreases as a function of age (Rutledge et al., 
2016).
Our reanalysis of article 12’s results, in conjunction 
with other methodological and theoretical criteria 
considerations heavily underlines this replication candidate 
as a promising target, reporting results that are in need of 
independent corroboration. We recommend a direct, or 
pure replication, such that the findings exactly as they are 
presented can be verified. In addition, we recommend a 
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conceptual replication in which significant changes to the 
characteristics of the sample are made (e.g., as mentioned, 
on the basis of the participants’ ages and religions).
Discussion
In this paper, we performed a large scale reanalysis of the 
results of a selection of articles published in Psychological 
Science in the years of 2015 and 2016 for which primary 
research findings were quantified by t-tests. Reanalyzing 
these results narrowed the pool of potential replication 
targets from 57 to 20 candidates. The Bayes factors 
for these candidate studies were between 0.97 and 
2.85. To further our demonstration, we selected three 
articles, and subjected them to the second phase of the 
selection process, involving qualitative assessment. The 
qualitative process revealed that two of these articles are 
suitable for replication: their findings are theoretically 
important and relevant, but the literature largely lacks 
direct corroborating evidence for the claims thus far. It 
revealed that the results could benefit from changes to 
the magnitude of the samples, and that several variables 
should be included in conceptual replications to help 
generalize the reported results beyond the original 
articles.
A set of replications for articles 4 and 12 could first 
provide support for the existence of an effect, given the 
results of the Bayesian reanalysis. Once an underlying 
true effect is found to likely exist via a direct replication, 
further conceptual replications could be designed to 
explicitly explore other cohorts to better establish the 
generalizability of the findings beyond the original 
experimental cohort. In the case of article 4, specifically 
targeting participants of certain age groups may be 
beneficial to help determine the malleability of the 
effect across the lifespan. For article 12, targeting specific 
religious groups may assist in helping establish whether 
the God priming effect extends to other religions for which 
God is not a figure directly associated with intervention. 
These conceptual replications could also feature designs 
which vary from the originals – for instance, a replication 
of article 4 could feature a design in which gender is a 
blocking variable, or even included as a variable of interest.
Replications for both articles should contain much 
larger sample sizes, to help eliminate issues of reliability. 
In order to conduct a compelling replication study, one 
may need a sample size greater than that in the original 
study, depending on how large the sample is in the 
original study. Low experimental power produces some 
problems with reliability of original findings, leading to 
poor reproducibility even when other experimental and 
methodological conditions are ideal, which they rarely are 
(Button et al., 2013; Wagenmakers & Forstman, 2014).
A simulation by Button and colleagues (2013) demon-
strates an argument against the common misconception 
that if a replication study has a similar effect size to the 
original, the replication will have sufficient power to 
detect an effect. They show that “… a study that tries to 
replicate a significant effect that only barely achieved 
nominal statistical significance (that is, p ~ 0.05) and that 
uses the same sample size as the original study, will only 
achieve ~50% power, even if the original study accurately 
estimated the true effect size” (p. 367). This indicates that 
in order to obtain sufficient power (say, 1–β = .8) for a 
medium effect size in a replication study, the original 
sample would need to be more than doubled. In terms of 
the sample size in question, this indicates an increase from 
N = 105 to N = 212 for each of the replication studies.
Choice Justifications
Prior Choice
Though we do not want to rehash decades of debate 
about prior selection, our use of a Bayesian approach in 
our reanalysis stage, necessitates a brief discussion on 
our choice of prior. We have chosen to use the default 
prior – the Cauchy – in the BayesFactor package. This 
choice is suitable for our goals for a few reasons (and we 
recommend that the typical user use the package defaults 
for the same reasons). First, the Cauchy prior’s properties 
make it an ideal choice for a weakly informative prior 
based on ‘general desiderata’ (Jeffreys, 1955). Second, 
even if we did want to use a subjective prior, the most 
obvious approach to doing so would yield unreliable 
results. Using the existing literature on an effect to inform 
one’s prior choice would be a poor idea due to publication 
bias. Other factors exist that complicate subjective prior 
use. For instance, the existing literature on a particular 
phenomenon might be conflicting (in which case, the 
‘right’ subjective prior might not exist), or may be very 
sparse (in which case little information would be available 
to adequately inform the prior). This being said, there are 
potential users of our method that may have sufficient 
expertise to navigate this complex situation and wish to 
select an alternative to the Cauchy prior. We refer such 
users to Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) or to Gronau, 
Ly and Wagenmakers (2019), both of which deal with 
Bayesian t-tests with explicit prior information available.
Selection Based on Significance
We used statistical significance as the criterion for selecting 
results for the Bayesian reanalysis. One may wonder why 
we have not chosen to inspect the claims of the non-
existence of an effect based on a non-significant p-value. 
We have two reasons for using statistical significance 
(that is, when original article authors used statistical 
significance to justify their claims). First, although we 
believe statistical significance is hardly diagnostic of a true 
effect, the lack of statistical significance being related to 
no effect is even more complicated. If one were to try to 
replicate a non-significant result, what would the result 
say of the original effect? This problem does not exist for, 
say, an original study with a strong pro-null Bayes factor 
result, as the Bayes factor allows us to actually quantify 
pro-null evidence.
Finally, some applications of our method could be 
constrained by the capabilities or resources of replicating 
labs – not all suitable replication candidates can be 
replicated by all interested parties, as shown in our 
description above. The study of article 4 is worthwhile as 
a replication target and warrants further investigation, 
however it requires specialized equipment and specific 
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expertise to be recreated, and is therefore only feasible 
for select labs to seriously attempt. On the other hand, 
article 12 features a less specialized set of materials that 
could be recreated by a research group using easily-
accessible university provided software (e.g., Qualtrics) 
and web-browsers.
Limitations of the reanalysis should be noted. It is not 
always clear from the reporting articles which test statistic 
is most suitable to extract for purposes of reanalysis. One 
main reason for this difficulty was outlined earlier in the 
methods section of the study – inconsistent reporting 
practices. Despite a clear and detailed article published 
in American Psychologist by the APA in 2008 that 
discusses desirable reporting standards in psychology, 
and other initiatives in other fields to improve research 
reporting (e.g., the guidelines developed to improve 
the reporting of randomized-controlled trials in health-
related research: Moher, Schulz, & Altman, 2001), many 
researchers in the social sciences have failed to adopt 
them (Mayo-Wilson, 2013). To be clear, poor standards 
of reporting are not the norm only in psychological 
science. To illustrate: Mackey (2012) in linguistics research 
states that insufficient reporting of details important for 
replication is problematic in many studies (p. 26); Button 
and colleagues (2013) in biomedical research, discuss the 
relationship between insufficient reporting of statistical 
details and false positives in results. We also recognize 
that it is difficult to manage a good balance between 
adequate reporting and the word limit in many (especially 
higher-impact) journals. Though, on the other hand, 
authors can upload supplementary documents to the 
various platforms available (the Open Science Framework, 
or Curate Science, for instance), or submit.
Another limitation regards our reanalysis of only t-tests. 
While reanalysis of more complex designs is possible 
using the Bayes factor package, we only demonstrate with 
the simpler design of the t-test. We intend to show, by 
this demonstration, a proof of concept of a methodical 
and evidence-driven approach to choosing targets for 
replication. The Bayesian reanalysis is a clear strength, 
from which replicating labs can draw, however we do not 
advocate only the use of a Bayesian reanalysis. We must 
consider factors that place the article and its content in 
context. We must consider its appropriateness as a study 
for replication (is a replication feasible for less well-
equipped or specialist labs?), as well as the literature 
body it is part of. Is the study generally well supported, or 
does it tell a story conflicting with existing findings? Is it 
theoretically important, and does it hold relevance in its 
current historical, social and cultural context?
The reader may wonder why we have chosen not 
to assess the soundness of certain aspects of the 
methodologies of the original studies as a criterion for 
what studies to replicate. Although we argue that such a 
set of assessments is outside of the scope of the article, 
we recognize that to attempt to replicate an effect 
elicited by a poor methodological set-up is ill advised. 
We recommend that users of our method use their own 
judgment to determine whether or not an original article’s 
methods are sound, and to consider each experiment of 
their final filtered sample in turn. If the methods of the 
final sample of potential targets is difficult for a user to 
assess (for example, perhaps one ends up with two targets 
using highly technical methods that the typical user may 
be unfamiliar with), the user may want to limit themselves 
to those studies for which they are confident assessing the 
soundness of the chosen methodology.
A practical yet somewhat philosophical argument must 
be raised of how one might use the Bayesian reanalysis to 
prioritize replication targets. The reader critical of Bayes 
factors may suggest that no matter what classification 
one uses (Jeffreys or otherwise), Bayes factors still do 
not provide a complete measure of the information 
contained in a given original study. This reader would 
be right, though this can be said for any currently used 
quantification approach. We stress that we are not 
advertising the Bayesian reanalysis as the only route to a 
search for replication targets. We argue that it is a tool 
one can apply to reveal valuable information to use to 
distinguish between pro-null evidence and ambiguous 
study results. In this demonstration, it was valuable as 
a kind of centrifuge – filtering the studies into different 
‘weight’ categories based on the evidence from the 
results, which helps us determine which studies should be 
replicated first. The Bayesian reanalysis can be conducted 
relatively easily for most interested users with the 
statistical software R, using the code we have provided on 
our OSF page https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/3RF8B, 
to reduce the amount of potential replication targets, 
allowing individuals to direct their resources in a manner 
based on a justifiable and systematic method.
In this paper, we have chosen to have our statistical 
considerations be guided by the strength of evidence 
for the existence of an effect. Strong evidence can result 
from a large sample drawn from a relatively modest true 
effect, or a modest sample drawn from a large true effect. 
Other criteria are conceivable, such as those based on the 
precision of the effect size estimate.
A final important consideration for the reader concerns 
the role of publication bias in the pool of potential targets, 
and therefore final target selection. The work of Etz and 
Vandekerckhove (2016) suggests that if one were to take 
all studies as the possible pool of targets (that is, take 
publication bias into account), the average effect size will 
be smaller, and, presumably, the pool of viable targets much 
larger. Although their results suggest that an estimate of 
average strength of evidence based on published results is 
an overestimate, under the assumptions that (1) a single 
study has not been replicated many times in the same lab 
and only the most compelling result reported; and (2) a 
single study has not been duplicated exactly somewhere 
else in the world but was never reported; the reported test 
statistic can be safely reanalyzed in the way we have in 
our paper.
Aside from this, to date over 200 academic journals use 
the registered report format (for an up-to-date figure, see 
https://cos.io/rr/), and the number is steadily climbing. 
We consider it likely that as time passes and more people 
take advantage of this submission format, publication 
bias prevalence will decrease.
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We would like to stress that the articles discussed in 
detail in this study were selected for illustration purposes 
only. The demonstration serves as proof of concept, and 
by no means aims to criticize specific studies or question 
their veracity. In fact, one of the three articles has two 
OSF badges (for more information see https://cos.io/our-
services/open-science-badges-details/): one for open data, 
and one for open materials, indicating that the authors 
have made their data and study materials openly available 
on their project’s OSF page. One of the other articles 
has the badge for open materials. The third article has 
provided access to their study materials in a supplemental 
folder available on the Psychological Science website. 
Such a commitment to transparent scientific practices 
are associated with research that is of higher quality, and 
therefore likely to be more reproducible (see the OSF 
badge page: https://cos.io/our-services/open-science-
badges-details/ for a discussion).
The current debate over poor reproducibility in psychol-
ogy has led to a number of new ideas for how to improve our 
research going forward. Increased numbers of replication 
studies is one such advance, which has been taken up 
wholeheartedly by many concerned researchers. While such 
an initiative marks a positive and constructive move toward 
remedying a serious problem in our field, it is neither 
efficient nor useful to replicate results randomly. In this 
article, we have argued for and demonstrated an approach 
which is methodical and systematic, supplemented by 
careful and defensible qualitative analysis toward the 
selection of replication targets.
The approach we advocate and apply in this article can 
be simple and relatively fast to conduct, and affords the 
user access to important information about the strength 
of evidence contained in a published study. Although 
efficient, this approach has the potential to maximize 
the impact of the outcomes of those replications, and 
minimize the waste of resources that could result from 
a haphazard approach to replication. Combining a 
quantitative reanalysis with a qualitative assessment 
process of a large group of potential replication targets 
in a simple approach such as the one presented in this 
paper, allows the information of multiple sources to 
prioritize replication targets, and can assist in refining 
the methodology of the replication study.
Appendix A
Table showing details of each reanalyzed result, and 
relevant information associated with each article. A full 
spreadsheet of all information can be found at the project’s 
OSF page https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/3RF8B.






1 a Ding et al. 2015 4.42 40 42 <.001 283.12 1
1 b Ding et al. 2015 3.49 40 42 <.001 27 1
2 Metcalfe et al. 2015 7.28 87 89 <.0001 106765637.21 1
4 a Reinhart et al. 2015 2.605 17 18 0.018 3.19 1
5 a Fan et al. 2015 2.81 46 48 0.007 6.25 1
5 b Fan et al. 2015 2.51 46 48 0.016 3.44 1
6 a Schroeder et al. 2015 3.79 157 160 <.01 213 1
7 a Mackey et al. 2015 4.4 56 58 0.0001 412.32 1
7 b Mackey et al. 2015 4.7 56 58 <.0001 1030.14 1
8 a Dai et al. 2015 2.47 214 216 0.01 5.05 1
9 a Okonofua et al. 2015 4.06 23 25 <.001 139.62 1
9 b Okonofua et al. 2015 –4.99 23 25 <.001 1158.7 1
10 b Olson et al. 2015 4.3 16 17 0.001 126.81 1
10 a Olson et al. 2015 3.89 29 30 0.001 114.57 1
10 c Olson et al. 2015 6.75 29 30 <.001 151537.61 1
11 a Yin et al. 2015 5.73 15 16 <.001 644.57 1
11 b Yin et al. 2015 3.23 15 16 0.006 8.84 1
11 d Yin et al. 2015 5.88 15 16 <.001 1646.23 1
11 e Yin et al. 2015 2.59 15 16 0.021 6 1
11 f Yin et al. 2015 2.84 15 16 0.012 9.07 1
14 Storm et al. 2015 3.23 19 20 0.004 10.21 1
15 Perilloux et al. 2015 7.49 482 484 <.001 18931144326.12 1
18 Porter et al. 2016 2.89 85 88 0.005 7.91 1
(Contd.)
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Data Accessibility Statement
The database including all article information and 
reanalyzed Bayes factors are available, along with the 
analysis and plot R scripts, on the project’s OSF page: 
https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/3RF8B.
Supplemental Material
All files associated with this study are found on the project’s 
OSF page: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/3RF8B
Notes
 1 For a more detailed primer on the Bayes factor, please 
see Appendix A in Field and colleagues (2016); for a 
full expose, see Etz and Vandekerckhove (2018).
 2 We note that some of Mackey’s guidelines lead to 
subjective decisions about what is theoretically relevant 
and important. What may be theoretically important in 
one field, may not be worth investigating in another, 
and so it is vital to consider the context of a potential 






19 Skinner et al. 2016 4.25 66 67 <.001 297.55 1
20 Kirk et al. 2016 3.59 43.35 54 0.001 40.35 1
22 a Cooney et al. 2016 3.76 29 30 0.001 83.98 1
22 b Cooney et al. 2016 4.27 57 59 <.001 285.37 1
22 c Cooney et al. 2016 6.83 149 150 <.001 42432905.55 1
23 Zhou et al. 2016 7.26 70 73 <.001 19638415.24 1
25 b Saint-Aubin et al. 2016 6.02 34 35 <.0001 21066.77 1
25 a Saint-Aubin et al. 2016 5.6 45 46 <.0001 13805.45 1
26 a Li et al. 2016 4.08 22 24 0.0005 53.71 1
26 b Li et al. 2016 3.86 26 28 0.00068 38.61 1
29 Sloman et al. 2016 -3.4 69 70 0.001 22.86 1
30 b Picci et al. 2016 2.8 27 28 0.001 10.5 1
30 c Picci et al. 2016 4.4 27 28 0.001 273.96 1
30 d Picci et al. 2016 3.14 29 30 0 20.56 1
3 Madore et al. 2015 2.49 22 23 0.021 2.67 3
4 b Reinhart et al. 2015 2.318 17 18 0.033 1.99 3
4 c Reinhart et al. 2015 2.326 17 18 0.033 2.02 3
4 d Reinhart et al. 2015 2.263 17 18 0.04 1.83 3
4 e Reinhart et al. 2015 2.466 17 18 0.027 2.53 3
6 b Schroeder et al. 2015 2.09 215 218 0.04 1.14 3
8 b Dai et al. 2015 2 211 213 0.047 0.97 3
11 c Yin et al. 2015 2.47 15 16 0.026 2.52 3
12 a Kupor et al. 2015 2.21 59 61 0.031 1.96 3
12 c Kupor et al. 2015 2.22 98 100 0.029 1.83 3
12 b Kupor et al. 2015 2.27 200 202 0.024 1.68 3
13 Farooqui et al. 2015 2.2 20 21 0.04 1.64 3
16 Olsson et al. 2016 2.44 97 100 0.02 2.85 3
17 Watson-Jones et al. 2016 2.05 86 88 0.043 1.38 3
21 Hung et al. 2016 -2.51 19 20 0.02 2.75 3
24 b Hsee et al. 2016 2.35 17 20 <.031 2.37 3
24 a Hsee et al. 2016 2.25 52 54 0.029 2.13 3
27 Constable et al. 2016 2.1 35 38 0.04 1.7 3
28 Chen et al. 2016 2.39 187 189 0.018 2.21 3
30 a Picci et al. 2016 2.25 29 30 0.032 2.15 3
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replication target, and root one’s judgments in 
quantifiable argumentation.
 3 Bayes factors can show evidential strength in favor of 
an alternative hypothesis (denoted BF10), or be inverted 
and show support for the null hypothesis (denoted 
BF01). In this article, we only discuss Bayes factors in 
terms of their support of the alternative, and so refrain 
from using the specific subscript notation or verbal 
indication.
 4 We originally planned to consider those articles with 
the smallest Bayes factors, however, as we discuss later, 
there are many results with similar Bayes factors (e.g., 
1.64, 1.68 and 1.70), which makes that choice alone 
somewhat arbitrary.
 5 More complicated approaches to handle the case 
of multiple studies in a single paper corroborating 
a certain claim in the manuscript exist, for instance 
through a Bayesian model-averaged meta-analysis.
 6 We only target these articles to practically demonstrate 
how our approach can be used. We do not imply 
that they are of low veracity or that the results were 
obtained by questionable means.
 7 Of course, the replication as described here would 
need to feature different risk-taking activities, as aged 
persons may be averse in general to activities such as 
skydiving.
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